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THE LIMITS OF GROUP RIGHTS:
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
BERNADETTE MEYLER*

Scholars and advocates of religious liberty within the United
States are beginning to suggest that our constitutional discourse
has focused too intently on individual rights and that our attention should now turn to the interests of religious institutions and
the notion of church autonomy. Rick Garnett, for instance, has
contended that "authentic freedom of religion does not exist when
its manifestation in and expression through the life of non-state
institutions and communities is prohibited" and that "independence for such institutions and communities is both a feature of
and a necessary condition for political freedom.", The reorientation of jurisprudence on religious liberty that such proposals encourage is not without parallel in other national contexts. In
Europe, for example, religious institutions have occupied a central place in discussions of religious liberty and have often been
officially "recognized" by the state in a manner that affords them
substantial latitude in organizing their internal affairs and al* Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. For helpful comments and questions,
I am grateful to Nelson Tebbe and the other participants in the 2007 St. John's Journal of
Legal Commentary Symposium on "Religion and Morality in the Public Square." I have
also benefited greatly from the research assistance of Jessica Felker and discussions with
Doug Kysar.
1 Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 66 (publication forthcoming 2008). See generally Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights:
Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515 (2007);
Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002) (arguing in favor of the notion that religious entities occupy a somewhat-although not entirely--distinctive place within the U.S. constitutional system).
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lows them to partner with the state as valued components of civil
society. 2 This form of state recognition of religion has been heralded by its champions as increasing the autonomy of the
church. 3 Heeding calls to attend to church autonomy could thus
bring the United States into closer harmony with its European
4
counterparts.
Placing priority on church autonomy might, however, generate
unforeseen obstacles to the exercise of religious liberty. In particular, emphasizing religious institutions may lead to the unequal treatment of individuals and entities of minority religious
persuasions. As Rik Torfs acknowledged quite frankly in arguing
for a conception of church autonomy that would entail collaboration between religious entities and the state, "Relationships between the state and churches are always, to some extent, at the
expense of complete equality among all religious groups." 5 Bahia
Tazib-Lie has likewise emphasized that recent religious registration laws appear unnecessarily restrictive and "seem to target
small existing or new religious and belief communities in an effort to prevent them gaining appropriate legal status."6 Before
endorsing an expansive vision of church autonomy in the U.S.
context, it is therefore crucial to examine the nature and extent

2 See infra notes 27-33, 77 and accompanying text.
3 See Roland Minnerath, The Right to Autonomy in Religious Affairs, in FACILITATING
FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A DESKBOOK 291, 319 (Tore Lindholm et al. eds., Martinus Nijhoff 2004) (describing the "concordat model" under which "the church institutions
at canon law receive civil effect in civil law and are able to act in the juridical order of the
state" as "probably the most advanced model representing state respect of the internal
autonomy of churches").
4 See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
5 Rik Torfs, Relationship Between the State and Religious Groups, in LA PROTECTION
INTERNATIONALE DE LA LIBERTiE RELIGIEUSE (International Protection of Religious Freedom) 131, 139 (J-F. Flauss ed., 2002); see Tad Stahnke, Equality and Religious Preferences: Theoretical, International and Religious Perspectives, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 87, 117 (Peter G. Danchin & Elizabeth A. Cole eds., Columbia University Press 2002) (concluding that "[d]ifferential treatment in state recognition of religious communities represents an important subset of
problems in discrimination on the basis of religion").
6 Bahia Tahzib-Lie, in LA PROTItCTION INTERNATIONALE DE LA LIBERTt RELIGIEUSE,
supra note 5, at 57, 72; see Johan D. Van der Vyver, Freedom of Religion or Belief and
Other Rights, in FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF , supra note 3, at 85, 92
("Perhaps the greatest assault upon the sovereignty of religious institutions derives from
state-imposed regulations rendering the very existence, or at least the effective functioning, of such institutions dependent upon their registration with political authorities").
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of religious inequality that the concept has helped to perpetuate
in the international arena.
As an analysis of pertinent cases from the jurisprudence of international tribunals will demonstrate, the monolithic conception
of religious associations that has emerged from an institutionally
oriented approach to religious liberty has resulted in the neglect
of the equality of free exercise on the individual level and, concomitantly, disregard for the freedom of religious dissent and
sub-group formation. If one of the principal problems facing the
contemporary U.S. jurisprudence of religious liberty is an excessive focus on the individual, rather than attention to the individual in relation to a religious collectivity, one of the obstacles to
international human rights bodies' protection of religious freedom is, by contrast, a willingness to tolerate an excessively unitary conception of the religious institution. 7 Two forms of this difficulty emerge from adjudication under the European Convention
on Human Rights (hereinafter "Convention")8 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter "Covenant").9 In the former context, states are accorded a significantalthough not absolute-"margin of appreciation" when they
choose to legitimate one particular version of a religion over others.1 0 In the latter context, religious minorities are defined in
such narrow terms as to make the invocation of a "group" religious right both difficult to accomplish and apt to result in future
7 See Thomas W. Simon, Prevent Harms First: Minority Protection in International
Law, 9 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 129, 132 (1997) (positing that Article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights explicitly protects the rights of minorities as "the
only global provision of a legally binding nature guaranteeing minorities their language,
religion, and culture"); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 18, GA Res.
217A, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) (describing religious practice as occurring "either individually or in community with others"); Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22,
Article 18, 48th Sess., Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 4, Sept. 27, 1993, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/O/9a3O112c27 dl167cc12563edOO4d8f15 (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (explaining that religious practice also includes 'acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs). See generally Adeno Addis, Individualism,
Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615
(1992) (illustrating that it is important not to overestimate the extent to which international treaties actually do attend to group rather than individual rights).
8 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (hereinafter "Convention").
9 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (hereinafter "Covenant").
10 See infra notes 13-47 and accompanying text.
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discrimination against emergent and less populous groups.11
Both of these contexts might lead us to have reservations about
the ancillary effects of placing priority on religious institutions
for purposes of securing church autonomy despite the potential
advantages that Garnett and others have identified.12

Despite the continuing predominance of individualism in international human rights law, the European Court of Human
Rights (hereinafter "Court"), which adjudicates cases that applicants bring under the Convention, has, as some critics have observed, sometimes downplayed the individual's interest in free
exercise. 13 The Court has, however, been quite permissive in recent years in recognizing a variety of claims brought by religious
institutions or their directors under Article 9 of the Convention,
although this article, by its own terms, seems to protect the religious belief and practice of the individual-at most "in community with others"-rather than the activities of religious communities or institutions as such.14 Some of these cases have arisen
IISee infra notes

48-61 and accompanying text.
12See supra, note 1.
13See Javier Martinez-Torron, The European Court of Human Rights and Religion, in
LAW AND RELIGION 185, 193 (Richard O'Dair and Andrew Lewis ed. 2001) ('The European
Convention is like all other international documents [of human rights] ... in that it treats
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion as a right that belongs primarily to individuals. On a conceptual level, any right of a religious association appears as a 'product' derived from the individual's right. However, the strictly individual dimension of this freedom is one that, paradoxically, has been under-protected in the jurisprudence of the
European Court").
14 "An ecclesiastical or religious body may, as such, exercise on behalf of its adherents
the rights guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention." Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek v.
France, Application no. 27417/95 at para. 72, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Press/2000/JunlCha'are%20jud%20epresse.htm
(last visited
Oct. 1, 2007). It was only in 1979, however, that standing was granted to religious institutions under the Convention; they are now viewed as representing "an aggregation of the
rights of their members." Brett G. Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1217, 1277-78 (2004).
According to Article 9 of the Convention:
1.
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,
practice and observance.
2.
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protec-
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from state intervention in the internal organization of a religion,
and the applicants have complained of restrictions on their ability to worship resulting from the government's activity.15 For example, Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria concerns a situation in
which Bulgaria took sides in a dispute between two rival Muslim
groups, legitimating one rather than the other and allowing the
former to forcibly evict the applicant from the premises of the
Chief Mufti's office in Sophia.16
Despite an adverse decision by the Court, Bulgaria continued
to insist upon a unitary Muslim leadership, leading to the more
recent decision in Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v. Bulgaria.17 Holding that Bulgaria had again violated Article 9 of the ECHR, the European Court explained:
[T]he autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society. While it
may be necessary for the State to take action to reconcile the
interests of the various religions and religious groups that
coexist in a democratic society, the State has a duty to remain neutral and impartial in exercising its regulatory
power and in its relations with the various religions, denominations and beliefs. What is at stake here is the preservation of pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy, one of the principal characteristics of which is the

tion of public order ["la defense de l'ordre"], health ["la protection de
la sant6"] or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.
Convention, supra note 8, at art. 9. The parenthetical phrases are taken from the French
text of the Convention, which is equally authoritative. The fact that the two versions are
equally authoritative does not, however, mean that they are always synonymous. See
Dinah Shelton, Reconcilable Differences? The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties, 20
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 611, 622-23 (1997).
15 See Javier Martinez-Torr6n, Limitations on Religious Freedom in the Case Law of the
European Court of Human Rights, 19 EMoRY INT'L L. REV. 587, 613-18 (2005) (analyzing
the Court's treatment of these cases and suggesting that "[p]roblems arise . . . when the
State provides a specific support or recognition to religious communities-which implies
normally a certain degree of control of religious affairs-and those communities become
divided").
16 Application no. 30984/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000) available at http://www.echr.coe.int
/EnglPress/2000/Oct/Hasan%20and%2OChaush%20jud%20epress.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2007).
17 Application no. 39023/97Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004) available at http://www.echr.coe.int
/Eng/Press/2004/Dec/ChamberjudgmentSupremeHolyCounciloftheMuslimCommunityvBu
lgaria16122004.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
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possibility it offers of resolving a country's problems through
dialogue, even when they are irksome.' 8
Here the Court seems to insist on the possibility of religious
groups' autonomy and independence from the State, which must
act neutrally across religious denominations. The proper functioning of democracy itself, the Court suggests, entails that the
State refrain from requiring a single authorized version or representative of each religion.
If the protection of church autonomy and the self-organization
of religious communities are implicit in the free exercise provisions of Article 9 of the Convention, a norm of non-discrimination
arises from Article 14, a norm that the Court has also applied to
religious institutions.19 When, for example, Greece refused to
grant the Canea Catholic Church legal personality despite permitting legal standing to both the Jewish and Orthodox communities, the Court noted that a breach of Article 14 had occurred
since "the applicant church, which owns its land and buildings,
has been prevented from taking legal proceedings to protect
them, whereas the Orthodox Church or the Jewish community
can do so in order to protect their own property without any formality or required procedure." 20 When the government of
Moldova refused to recognize a local, autonomous Orthodox
church founded in 1992, the Court imported the equality norm
into Article 9 in deciding in favor of the applicant and maintained that "the allegations relating to Article 14 amount to a
repetition of those submitted under Article 9. Accordingly, there
is no cause to examine them separately." 2 1 The tight conceptual
connection between Articles 9 and 14 also appears in the Court's
reasoning in Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community; by
8
1Id. at para. 93.
19 According to Article 14:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
Convention, supra note 8, at art. 14.
20 The Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, Application no. 25528/94, para. 47, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (1997), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.inttkpl97/view.asp?action=html&key
=31838&portal=hbkm&source=external&table=285953B33D3AF94893DC49EF6600CEB
D49 (last visited (Oct. 1, 2007).
21 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, Application no.
0045701/99 at para. 134, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), availableat http://www.echr.coe.int/eng
/Press/2001/Dec/MetropolitanChurchofBessarabiajudepress.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
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invoking the desirability of state neutrality and impartiality with
regard to disparate religious denominations, the Court in that
case implicitly interpreted Article 9 in light of the nondiscrimination norm of Article 14.
Seemingly in conflict with the lofty rhetoric of Supreme Holy
Council of the Muslim Community and the non-discrimination
emphasis of Canea Catholic Church, the Court, in Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, upheld France's decision to grant authorization for ritual slaughter to one association of kosher
butchers and not another, invoking the notion that states enjoy a
substantial margin of appreciation "with regard to establishment
of the delicate relations between the churches and the state" and
explaining that "[organization] by the State of the exercise of
worship is conducive to religious harmony and tolerance." 22 This
case represents the limit point of the Court's concern with the
equal treatment of religious organizations; by emphasizing that
France was operating to protect the "ordre public" and acting
within its legitimate margin of appreciation, 2 3 the Court discounted the inequality of the government's treatment of the largest and most long-standing Jewish group in France, the Jewish
Consistorial Association of Paris ("ACIP"), and the applicant association, the Jewish liturgical association Cha'are Shalom Ve
Tsedek. 2 4 Furthermore, by framing the question of discrimination in terms of the treatment of the association as a whole
rather than individuals' religious practice, the Court substantially downplayed the additional burden that the state had
placed upon individuals whose religious beliefs required that
they eat glatt meat slaughtered in accordance with the standards
articulated by Cha'are Shalom. 2 5 Rather than inquiring as to
whether individuals of other religious persuasions were allowed
to engage in similar practices to those that the applicants were
22 Cha'are Shalom at para. 84.
23 See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
24 For a description of the two organizations, see Cha'areShalom at paras. 22-30.
25 As the European Court observed, "For meat to qualify as 'glatt', the slaughtered animal must not have any impurity, or in other words any trace of a previous illness, espe[A]ccording to [Cha'are Shalom], the ritual slaughterers under the
cially in the lungs ....
authority of the Beth Din, the rabbinical court of the ACIP ... now no longer make a detailed examination of the lungs and are less exacting about purity and the presence of
filaments so that, in [Cha'are Shalom's] submission, butchers selling meat certified as kosher by the Central Consistory are selling meat which its members consider impure and
therefore unfit for consumption." Id. at para. 32.
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prohibited from exercising, the European Court simply asked
whether it was absolutely impossible for the individual members
26
of Cha'are Shalom to obtain glatt meat.
Underpinning the case lies the French version of the system of
state organization of religious worship. Despite the separation of
church and state instituted by the Act of 9 December 1905 and
the reigning principle of "laicit6", France still requires recognition and authorization of religious bodies for the purpose of performing ritual slaughter of animals. 27 Of the various European
regimes providing a particular legal status for religions, that of
France appears to be among the more egalitarian. 2 8 Still, examination of the processes leading to the denial of authorization to
Cha'are Shalom illuminates some of the residual connections between the criteria for recognition that other, less egalitarian
countries deploy and that which France continues to invoke.
Torfs has recently advocated in favor of five pre-requisites for
granting special privileges to particular religions that he extrapolated from existing paradigms. 29 These include: assessing the
number of adherents of the particular faith; attending to the history of the religious group; ensuring that the religion does not
26 Id. at paras. 80-82.
27 "[R]itual slaughter may be performed only by slaughterers authorized for the purpose by religious bodies which have been approved by the Minister of Agriculture, on a
proposal from the Minister of the Interior." Id. at para. 48 (quoting Decree no. 80-791 of 1
October 1980, art. 10). The meaning of the term "laicitC"is notoriously elusive, although it
functions as the pillar of the French conception of the relationship between religion and
the state. See generally T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laicit6: A Comparison of
the United States and France, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 419 (2004). According to the 2003 report of a commission appointed by French President Jacques Chirac, laicit6 involves three
principles, those of 'liberty of conscience, equality of rights in spiritual and religious
choices, and neutrality of political power." Id. at 462 (quoting Rapport au president de la
r~publique (2003), http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/034000725
/0000.pdf). Laicit6 is interpreted as requiring that "public spaces such as schools be set
apart from religious activities and symbols." Judith Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert Cover, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 17, 20
(2005).
28 Torfs has suggested that France fits within the paradigm of "unilateral" state treatment of religion, according to which "[tlhe state establishes a system, which at least at
first glance, is treating all religious groups equally." Torfs, supra note 5, at 137. A less
egalitarian approach is that of Belgium, which possesses a two-tiered system according to
which very few religions have managed to attain recognition and these are entitled to
state financial support. See Willy Fautr6, The Protection of Religious Minorities in Belgium: A Western EuropeanPerspective, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS
MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 5, at 408-34.
29 Torfs, supra note 5, at 141-45.
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encourage criminal activities; looking to the length of the religious group's presence in the particular country; and evaluating
whether the religion in question shares democratic values with
the state. 30 In denying Cha'are Shalom's attempt to obtain authorization for ritual slaughter, the French government emphasized several of the criteria that Torfs enumerated. The state
suggested that Cha'are Shalom was not comparable with the
ACIP because it possessed only 40,000 adherents rather than
700,000.31 Furthermore, the fact that the Central Consistory, of
which the ACIP was an offshoot, "had been administering Jewish
worship in France for two hundred years" rendered it "a legitimate negotiating partner" for the state. 3 2 Finally, negotiating
with the ACIP better served, according to the state, the interests
of the "ordre public" (alternatively rendered in the English version of the opinion as "public policy" and "public order"), in particular by ensuring the protection of public health.33 Despite the
egalitarian thrust of the French laws, the rationale employed in
implementing them tended, in the case of Cha'are Shalom, to
militate in favor of long established and dominant denominations.
Some of the logic employed by the French government even
resonated with Bulgaria's arguments in the Hasan & Chaush
and Supreme Holy Council cases, insofar as France similarly emphasized the importance of identifying a single and representative negotiating partner for the particular religion. Thus, to
France, the significance of the supposedly small number of members of Cha'are Shalom was that denying licenses to such splinter
groups would avoid "a proliferation of approved bodies." 34 The
government likewise argued for the authority of the Chief Rabbi,
without apparent awareness of the favoritism that this stance
might signal. Although maintaining that "it was not for the
French authorities, bound as they were to respect the principle of
secularism, to interfere in a controversy over dogma," the government nevertheless "observed that it could not be contested
30 Id.
31Cha'areShalom, at para. 69.
32 Id. at para. 71.
33 Id. at paras. 71, 84 (translating "ordre public" in paragraph 71 as "public policy" and
in paragraph 84 as "public order").
34 Id. at para. 69.
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that the Chief Rabbi of France, whose opinion on the matter was
based on the rulings of the Beth Din (the rabbinical court), was
qualified to say what was or was not compatible with Jewish observance." 3 5 Retaining the ACIP as the state's negotiating partner-a negotiating partner with whom other groups like Cha'are
Shalom could reach their own provisional arrangements"guaranteed protection of the interests of the community and respect for the rules dictated by public policy [ordre public], particularly where health was concerned." 36 Furthermore, because a
Jewish entity had already been authorized to perform ritual
slaughter, French courts deemed that authorization could not be
granted to individual members of Cha'are Shalom in the absence
of ACIP approval. 3 7 Cha'are Shalom could instead negotiate with
ACIP to reach an accord through which its members could perform ritual slaughter under ACIP's authorization. 3 8 By expressing a desire for religious subgroups to coordinate their practices
through established religious institutions, these various statements echo, although somewhat more subtly, Bulgaria's insistence upon a unitary Muslim leadership.
To a significant extent, the Court's opinion accepted the French
government's arguments. 39 The decision itself oscillated between
examining the religious liberty claims on the associational and
individual levels. After determining that Cha'are Shalom, as an
"ecclesiastical or religious body," could bring the case on behalf of
its adherents under Article 9,40 the Court insisted upon defining
the right at issue in narrowly individualist terms. As the Court
held, although ritual slaughter fell within the protections of Article 9, "there would be interference with the freedom to manifest
one's religion only if the illegality of performing ritual slaughter
made it impossible for ultra-orthodox Jews to eat meat from ani35 Id. at para. 66. Alison Renteln has criticized this aspect of the opinion for allowing
the "dominant legal system" to "decide 0 which group to designate as the spokesperson for
the minority group." Alison Dundes Renteln, Cross-CulturalDispute Resolution: The Consequences of Conflicting Interpretationsof Norms, 10 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE
RESOL. 103, 113-15 (2002).
36 Cha'are Shalom, at para. 71.
37 Id. at paras. 40-44.
38 Id. at para. 82.
39 The French government had also contended that Cha'are Shalom's activities were
primarily commercial, rather than religious, a contention that the Court did not address.
Id. at para. 69.
40 Id. at para. 72.
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mals slaughtered in accordance with the religious prescriptions
they considered applicable." 4 1 Because glatt meat could be imported from Belgium, or Cha'are Shalom could negotiate with the
ACIP to be able to engage in ritual slaughter under the latter's
approval, the religious liberty of the individual members of the
association was not impeded.42 The Court thus neither accepted
that Cha'are Shalom as an association could possess the right
under Article 9 to engage in ritual slaughter nor contemplated
that an individual member of a religious association might have
a right to belong to a collectivity that would be entitled to determine and implement its own methods of ritual slaughter. The
Court's decision therefore endorsed a narrow view of both the individual and institutional rights protected by Article 9.
Furthermore, to the extent that an abridgement of the rights
ensured by Article 9 of the Convention had occurred-which the
Court declined to find-this abridgement would, the Court
deemed, have conformed to the requirements that limitations be
"prescribed by law" and "necessary in a democratic society" for
the "protection of public order [ordre public]" and "health."43 Despite this conclusion, the Court did not articulate whether or precisely how the type of ritual slaughter in which Cha'are Shalom
desired to engage would, in fact, pose a risk to public health
greater than that which the state already accepted in the ACIP's
and Muslim organizations' slaughter practices. The absence of
any such evidence suggests that the Court simply opted to accept
France's representations about the necessity of its scheme of authorization for preserving the "ordre public."
Turning to the non-discrimination provisions of Article 14, the
Court determined that the applicant association was not entitled
to absolutely equal treatment with the ACIP under Article 14,
and that, "in so far as there was a difference in treatment, [the
state] pursued a legitimate aim, and.., there was 'a reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and
41 Id. at paras. 72, 80 (emphasis added).
42 Id. at para. 83.
43 Convention, supra note 8, at art. 9, sect. 2. As Michel Levinet has observed, the
European Court's interpretation of the requirements of a "democratic society" has tended
to approximate the French notion of 'laicit6." See Michel Levinet, Socidtd Dgmocratique et
Laicitd dans la Jurisprudencede la Cour Europgenne des Droits de l'Homme, in LAICITi9,
LIBERTE E RELIGION ET CONVENTION EUROPItENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 81, 88 (Gdrard
Gonzalez ed., 2006).
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the aim sought to be realized."'44 France's legitimate aim consisted in the "protection of public health and public order ["ordre
public"]" through the "organization by the State of the exercise of
worship."45 Nowhere did the European Court consider the implications of combining the individual's Article 9 claim with the
equality provisions of Article 14 and comparing the ability of
other Jewish individuals to obtain meat slaughtered in the way
they believed to be necessary with that of members of Cha'are
Shalom.
Even the dissenting judges emphasized the Article 14 implications of the case on the associational rather than the individual
level. Their opinion explained that "the main problem in the present case lies in the discrimination of which the applicant association complained." 4 6 As they observed, "while it is possible for
tension to be created where a community, and a religious community in particular, is divided, this is one of the unavoidable
consequences of the need to respect pluralism. In such a situation the role of the public authorities is not to remove any cause
of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to take all necessary
measures to ensure that the competing groups tolerated each
other." 47 They focused, however, on the claims of Cha'are Shalom
as an association rather than those of its individual members.
The Court's jurisprudence, while focusing on groups, is thus
insufficiently sensitive to the potential problems occasioned by
state endorsement of a particular version of a certain religion or
state insistence on religious uniformity within a broader religious
tradition. Rather than generating a theory that would account
for the possibility of dissent within religious groups or disputes
about the identity of the group itself, the Court instead permits
states to favor stable religious organizations and downplays individual claims for freedom of religious manifestation. Although
this non-neutrality is most evident in Cha'are Shalom, it exists
even in cases like Supreme Holy Council, despite strong rhetorical claims to the contrary. The ideals of state neutrality and
church autonomy espoused in that case cannot simultaneously
hold. As Cha'are Shalom rendered transparent, the practices of
44 Cha'are Shalom, at para. 87.
45 Id. at para. 84.
46 Id. at para. 2 (Bratza, dissenting).
47 Id. at para. 1 (Bratza, dissenting).
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legitimating and partnering with religious institutions that are
entailed by the European conception of church autonomy lead
states to sacrifice the religious liberties of individuals and minority groups in favor of administrative order and a particular vision
of stable pluralist harmony.

Like the jurisprudence of Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention,
the background and fate of Article 27 of the Covenant demonstrate a similar bias in favor of well-established groups and illuminate how privileging particular minorities may disadvantage
others.48 Remarkably, although Article 27 should protect the
freedom of religious practice of minorities because it explicitly refers to the rights of religious minorities, no cases have yet arisen
in which members of an exclusively religious minority were able
to bring a successful claim under the provision. This situation
may result, in part, from the narrow interpretation of what constitutes an "ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority" under Article
27. In debates over the phrase, several State parties-especially
those accommodating of immigration-expressed concern that
the rights of minorities would be invoked to prevent the assimilation of newcomer groups, occasion the formation of new minorities, and fragment society.4 9 In addition, some countries feared
48 Article 27 of the Covenant reads: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right,
in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language." Covenant, supra note
9, at art. 27.
Article 27 is often considered to be the provision in international law most accommodating of collectively articulated rights. See Thomas W. Simon, Prevent Harms First:Minority Protection in InternationalLaw, 9 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 129, 132 (1997) ("Jurists have
highlighted Article 27 since it is the only global provision of a legally binding nature
guaranteeing minorities their language, religion, and culture").
49 See Marc J. Bossuyt, Guide to the 'Travaux Pr~paratoires' of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 495 (1987) ("The provisions concerning the rights of minorities, it was understood, should not be applied in such a manner as to encourage the
creation of new minorities or to obstruct the process of assimilation ....
It was felt that
such tendencies could be dangerous for the unity of the State ..
"); see also id. at 496 (internal citations omitted) ("Many delegations representing countries of immigration
stressed, however, that persons of similar background who entered their territories voluntarily, through a gradual process of immigration, could not be regarded as minorities, as
this would endanger the national integrity of the receiving States ... while the newcomers were free to use their own language and follow their own religion, they were expected
to become part of the national fabric. It was emphasized that the provisions of article 25
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that articulating the rights to be accorded minorities in too
broadly individualistic terms would permit everyone to claim the
same benefits. 50 As a consequence, the clause was drafted to restrict invocation of minority rights to those in states where minorities were deemed to exist and to protect such rights only
when practiced in collective contexts. 51 One further implication of
the collective enforcement of Article 27 rights is that the claims
of individual members of a minority are evaluated against the interests of the minority as a whole. According to the Human
Rights Committee (hereinafter "Committee"), the body that adjudicates claims brought by "authors" under the Covenant:
[W]here the rights of individuals to enjoy their own culture
is in conflict with the exercise of parallel rights by other
members of the minority group, or of the minority as a
whole, the Committee may consider whether the limitation
in issue is in the interests of all members of the minority
and whether there is reasonable and objective justification
for its application to the individuals who claim to be adversely affected.52
The Committee thus examines the internal dynamics of the
group to ascertain, according to a type of "best interests" approach, whether the claims of dissenting members of the minority are legitimate.
Such restrictions have manifold effects in the religious realm.
The assimilationist preference voiced by some of the signatory
States in the Travaux Prdparatoiressuggests that dispersed religions may not receive the protections of Article 27. Likewise,
the bias against the creation of new minorities, encapsulated by
[27] should not be invoked to justify attempts which might undermine the national unity
of any State").
50 See id. at 495 ("Also rejected was a proposal that 'every person shall have the right to
show freely his membership of an ethnic or linguistic group, to use without hindrance the
name of his group, to learn the language of this group and to use it in public or private
life' .....
It was thought that disruptive tendencies might result if 'every person' were to
claim the benefit of the rights of minorities. For this reason, it was decided to qualify the
exercise of minorities' rights with the clause 'in community with other members of their
group"').
51Id.
52 Mahuika v. New Zealand, Communication No. 547/1993, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess.,
para. 9.6, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC1701D/547/1993 (1992), available at http://www3.law.nyu.edu
fkingsburyb/springO4/indigenousPeoples/classmaterials/class44H-Mahuikaeta-v-NewZe
alandBayefsky-com.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
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the requirement of pre-existence, indicates that recently formed
religions could be treated differently than traditional ones under
the provision. The lower standard employed to evaluate limitations on the rights of dissenting members of minority groups
could also be used to suppress the liberties of denominations
within particular religions. Finally, the exclusive protection of
minorities represents a severely underinclusive solution to the
obstacles facing religious groups of all scales, and neglects the
substantial alterations in religious demography over time that
necessarily complicate efforts to recognize, or de-recognize, appropriate groups for protection.
The potential scope of some of these problems emerges with
greater clarity in the adjudication of Waldman v. Canada, the
only case in which a claim under Article 27 was brought by a
member of a specifically religious group.5 3 In Waldman, a Jewish
father who enrolled his children in a private Jewish day school
challenged Ontario's provision of separate school funding solely
to Catholic institutions. The father brought the case under Articles 18 and 26-the articles of the Covenant respectively ensuring individual religious liberty and non-discrimination-as well
as Article 27.54 While the Committee decided the case in
53 Waldman v. Canada, Communication No. 694/1996, U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., U.N.
Doc. CCPRIC/67/D/694/1996 (1999). Admittedly, the distinction between a religious and
an ethnic group may be difficult to draw. Thus the author in Waldman might be considered Jewish ethnically as well as from a religious standpoint. Other cases involving ethnic
minorities likewise include references to religion despite focusing primarily on cultural
practices. For example, in Mahuika, the authors "emphasize[d] that fishing is a fundamental aspect of Maori culture and religion." Mahuika, at para. 8.2.
54 Waldman, at para. 3.1. Article 18 of the Covenant, which resembles Article 9 of the
Convention, reads:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to have respect
for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity
with their own convictions.
Covenant, supra note 9, at art. 18.
Article 26 of the Covenant is parallel to Article 14 of the Convention and proclaims:
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Waldman's favor under Article 26, determining that Canada had
discriminated by paying only for Catholic and not other religious
schools, it did not address his Article 27 claim, finding that adjudicating the latter would be supererogatory given its Article 26
5
holding. 5
Judge Martin Scheinen's concurrence, however, objected to the
majority's failure to consider the Article 27 implications of the
case. 5 6 Although arguing in favor of deciding the case under Article 27, Judge Scheinen's opinion undermines its own position, to
a certain extent, by illuminating some of the difficulties that
could ensue from application of Article 27 in the context of religious minorities. Judge Scheinen emphasized that Ontario provided funding for Catholic schools for historical reasons; at the
time of Confederation in 1867, "Catholics represented 17% of the
population of Ontario, while Protestants represented 82%," causing concern that "the new province of Ontario would be controlled
by a Protestant majority that might exercise its power over education to take away the rights of its Roman Catholic minority."5 7
Given this historical backdrop, Judge Scheinen suggested that
any apparent discrimination in favor of Catholics should be
evaluated with reference to their status as minorities under Article 27. Rather than terminating the policy of supporting Catholic
schools, he maintained, "The question whether the arrangement.., should be discontinued is a matter of public policy and
the general design of the educational system within the State
party, not a requirement under the Covenant." 55 He also agreed
with the author's assertion of the State's duties under Article 27,
stating that, "When implementing the Committee's views in the
present case the State party should in my opinion bear in mind
that article 27 imposes positive obligations for States to promote
religious instruction in minority religions, and that providing
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
Covenant, supra note 9, at art. 27.
55 Waldman, at para. 10.7.
56 See generally id. (Scheinen, concurring).
57 Id. at para. 2.2 (Scheinen, concurring).
58
Id. (Scheinen, concurring).
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such education as an optional arrangement within the public
education system is one permissible arrangement to that end."59
At the same time, he acknowledged that allowing such education
for every religion might prove wasteful of state resources; his solution was for the State to base the decision about whether to
provide this kind of education on whether, in any particular
situation, "there is a constant demand." 60 Judge Scheinen's opinion thus highlights the temporally shifting status of religious
groups, which may lead a religion previously considered a "minority" either to become a majority or at least to be accepted to
the extent that it is capable of exercising repressive effects upon
6
other "minority" religions. 1

What conclusions, then, can we derive about church autonomy
from the deficiencies in implementation of the Convention and
the Covenant? One answer might be that a norm of church
autonomy, when unaccompanied by the ideals of either separation or neutrality that have at various points been located within
the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, can lead to
state discrimination in favor of long-standing and majoritarian
religious traditions. Even the presence of something like the Establishment Clause might, however, be insufficient to stem the
tendencies toward inequality that a conception of church autonomy like that in Europe tends to generate, just as the nondiscrimination provision of Article 14 of the Convention has
proved inadequate in this respect. At the same time, however,
the problems entailed by focusing on church autonomy should not
be solved by simply resorting to an individualist notion of religious liberty; we should, rather, as the texts of the Convention
59 Id. (Scheinen, concurring).
60 Id. (Scheinen, concurring).
61 Rik Torfs has observed a similar temporal problem with the state recognition of particular religions. As he writes, "A particular problem seems to be the loss of a privileged
position. What if certain historical elements become less important, are not any longer
perceived as an urgent reason for different treatment? Is any legal degradation of religious groups possible? . . . The main problem concerning privileged treatment based on
historical reasons is that it will often be a move in one direction, a move towards more
support. The opposite is rather unlikely." Torfs, supra note 5, at 143. Once granted a
privileged status, religious institutions may thus become entrenched and difficult to displace.
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and the Covenant themselves suggest, attend more to the mode
of relation between individual and group in the sphere of religion.
Previously, I have argued in favor of an interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution that avoids considering religious liberty claims as simply matters for the individual. In The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches
and Their History, I contended that, although the Free Exercise
Clause has generally been construed as protecting individuals'
rights to religious belief and practice, courts have historically
been willing to interpret the scope of particular persons' constitutionally guarded ability to engage in religious practice more expansively when considering the individual in relation to the religious group with which she claims affiliation. 62 This historical
tendency may be conceptually linked to the fact that the meaning
and significance of religious practices often become more apparent within a collective context. 63
On a doctrinal level, this group-centered construction of the activities protected by the Free Exercise Clause is correlated with a
substantive rather than a formal conception of equality and the
equal protection of the laws. 6 4 Courts considering religious
groups are thus inclined to examine, as a substantive matter, the
actual burdens placed upon the individual claimants' freedom of
religious exercise, rather than upholding laws because, as a formal matter, they are generally applicable. 6 5
In the federal context, the "equal protection of free exercise"
results from conjoining reasoning derived from the Fourteenth
62 Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protectionof Free Exercise: Two Approaches and Their
History, 47 B.C. L. REV. 275, 276-80 (2006).
63 Id. at 288; see Jacob T. Levy, Classifying Cultural Rights, in NOMOS XXXIX:
ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 22, 23-24 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997).
64 Meyler, supra note 62, at 276-77. This conception of equality within the arena of religious liberty stands in contrast to the notion of "equal liberty" that Christopher Eisgruber
and Lawrence Sager recently and eloquently espoused in Religious Freedom and the Constitution. See Christopher Eisgruber & Lawrence Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution 52 (2007) (stating as the three principles of "equal liberty" that "First, it insists
in the name of equality that no members of our political community ought to be devalued
on account of the spiritual foundations of their important commitments and projects. ...
Second, . . . Equal Liberty insists that aside from this deep and important concern with
discrimination, we have no constitutional reason to treat religion as deserving of special
benefits or as subject to special disabilities. Finally, equal liberty insists on a broad understanding of constitutional liberty generally").
65 Meyler, supra note 62, at 276-77.
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Amendment equal protection context with that coming out of the
First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. 66 State constitutions
had, however, as Philip Hamburger has extensively documented
and analyzed, incorporated their own versions of equal protection
and equal privileges and immunities clauses. 67 As I have argued,
early state courts deployed the conjunction of free exercise and
equal protection to effectuate some of the aims that might otherwise have been achieved by an establishment clause, including
that of avoiding discrimination among religious groups. 68
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court placed substantial limitations upon free exercise claims in Employment Division v.
Smith, 69 holding that neutral laws of general applicability are
valid against free exercise challenges. 70 As the resolution of
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah demonstrated,
however, the Court's invocation of neutrality and general applicability in Smith did not constitute mere verbiage. 7 1 In striking
down the city ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifice as targeting the Santeria church, Justice Kennedy also remarked that the
legislation exempted Kosher slaughtering from its purview. 72 Although he declined to consider whether this unequal treatment
constituted an independent constitutional violation, the Supreme
Court has on many occasions insisted upon the notion that
analogous religious practices must be treated equally. 73
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence has, some scholars maintain, shifted towards a paradigm of neutrality in the Establishment Clause context as well, leaving behind the goal of a wall of
separation between church and state. 7 4 Varying on this theme,
Doug Laycock has suggested considering the change as one in the
relevant conception of neutrality, where "the Court has sometimes measured neutrality from a baseline of government inac66 Id. at 278-79.
67 Id. at 277-78. See generally Philip Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate About Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev.
295.
68 Meyler, supranote 62, at 278.
69 499 U.S. 160 (1991).
70 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
71 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
72 Id. at 541.
73 Meyler, supranote 62 at 327-31.
74 See generally Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 230 (1994).
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tivity, and sometimes from a baseline of how government treats
analogous secular activities," and is increasingly preoccupied
with the latter.75
The approach to religious liberty that the Supreme Court has
recently adopted has brought American jurisprudence closer to
that of Europe but has not succeeded in merging the two. 76 This
is because European countries, unlike the United States, still often permit the state to act explicitly as an organizer of religious
practice and to respect church autonomy by granting recognition
to varying extents to religious institutions. 77 Such concern for the
administration of religion and the concomitant attention to the
institutional over the individual level of religious liberty conduces in a number of circumstances to a lack of equality between
individuals of different denominations or sub-denominations that
would be viewed as undesirable within the American framework
75 Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J.
43, 73 (1997).
76 Some European scholars appear to believe that this harmonization is already occurring. While remaining agnostic about whether the United States will move towards a
more institutionally-oriented approach to religious liberty, Rik Torfs indicates that this
trajectory would certainly be possible. See Torfs, supra note 5, at 152. Elisabeth Zoller is,
however, more skeptical, opining that the Establishment Clause renders the U.S. context
fundamentally different from the European. See Elisabeth Zoller, Les rapports entre les
,glises et les Etats aux Etats-Unis: Le Modele americainde pluralisme religieux4galitaire,
in LmCITt, LIBERTE DE RELIGION ET CONVENTION EUROPtENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME,
supra note 43, at 13, 48.
77 See Pierre-Henri Prelot, Difinir Juridiquement la LaicitM, in LAICITik, LIBERTE DE
RELIGION ET CONVENTION EUROPIENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, supra note 43, at 115,
140-41 (explaining the means by which the French Law of December 9, 1905 on the separation of church and state assured the collective status of religious communities and state
respect for the organization of these entities); Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and
State, supra note 14, at 1248-53, 1258-62 (distinguishing between three visions of church
autonomy, those of independence and inter-independence that have characterized the
U.S. model of religious liberty, and that of interdependence, which has held sway in
Europe); Tahzib-Lie, supra note 6, at 57, 72 (detailing the modes of registration of religious institutions and elaborating that 'Two main levels of registration can be distinguished. In some states, registration provides religious and belief communities rudimentary forms of legal personality that are sufficient to carry out their affairs. This base level
of registration typically lacks more extensive rights and privileges. Basically, it is a precondition for being tolerated or accepted as a religious or belief community. In other
states registration functions as a precondition for obtaining certain additional rights and
privileges, such as subsidies or taxes; the levying of church contributions; the performance of wedding ceremonies and the recognition of such marriages by law; permission to
engage in ritual slaughter; exemption from military service. There are different forms of
this upper tier level of registration"); Torfs, supra note 5, at 143 (contrasting the privileged relationship between the state and religious groups in Europe with the treatment of
religious institutions in America).

THE LIMITS OFGROUPRIGHTS

2007]

of religious liberty. The contrast between the Supreme Court's
approach in Church of the Lukumi and the French government's
stance in Cha'are Shalom demonstrates the gap that still remains despite the relaxation of the wall of separation in the
United States. Whereas the Supreme Court attempted to assure
that restrictions had not been placed upon the religious practice
of members of the Church of the Lukumi that were not applied to
individuals of other denominations, the French government insisted that it was appropriate to treat Cha'are Shalom differently
than the ACIP.
In the context of international law, a number of treaties and
the bodies adjudicating them attempt to protect religious liberty
through combining free exercise and equal protection reasoning
in a fashion quite similar to that of early American state courts.7 8
Thus, cases are often brought and evaluated under both Articles
9 and 14 of the Convention and under Articles 18 and 26 of the
Covenant. 79 This strategy results in simulating something like
an establishment clause but, as Cha'are Shalom illustrates, it
has not succeeded in ensuring government neutrality. There are
two principal reasons for this failure in the context of the Convention. First, the Court has been willing to accord a wide "margin of appreciation" to states when they allege that placing restrictions upon particular religious practices is either conducive
to public order or "necessary in a democratic society."8o Second,
and relatedly, the Court has endorsed a conception of pluralism
78 See Malcom D. Evans, The Evolution of Religious Freedom in Internationallaw: Present State and Perspectives, in LA PROTECTION INTERNATIONALE DE LA LIBERTt
RELIGIEUSE, supra note 5, at 15, 33 (speaking of "the well-established pattern of combining the expression of freedom of religion or belief.., with the norm of non-discrimination
.).
..

79 See supra notes 19-21, 54 and accompanying text.
80 See Peter Danchin & Lisa Forman, The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Religious Minorities, in PROTECTING THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 5, at 192, 206-

16 (criticizing the wide margin of appreciation that the ECHR has applied and its negative impact on the rights of minority religions); Levinet, supra note 43, at 87-88 (explaining that the ECHR grants a substantial margin of appreciation to states in the area of
religious liberty as long as they have assumed the task of attempting to ensure religious
pluralism within a democratic society as well as, more generally, protecting the individual
religious liberty of their members); Patrice Rolland, OrdrePublic et PratiquesReligieuses,
in LA PROTECTION INTERNATIONALE DE LA LIBERTIt RELIGIEUSE, supra note 5, at 231, 237

(noting that the ECHR allows for a wide margin of appreciation with regard to states' assessment of what kinds of restrictions on religious practice are necessary to preserve the
"ordre public").
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that does not simply entail self-sustaining sub-state groups, but
rather implicates the state itself in managing relations among
potentially conflicting entities.
The slippage between the English phrase "public order" and
the French notion of "ordre public" in adjudication under the
Convention illuminates the nature of the problem. Within various international law documents, including the Convention,
"public order" is rendered not as "ordre public" in the French versions, but instead as "ordre." The significance of this seemingly
small linguistic variation lies in the fact that "ordre public" possesses a particular meaning within French law, one that refers to
the society's public policies. 8 1 Stating that religion should be limited only by concern for "order" as opposed to "ordre public" implies that it should not be restricted on account of mere public
policy, but rather only on account of some actual disruption of the
polity. In the Cha'areShalom case, however, the French opinion,
in justifying any limitation upon the association's religious liberty that the government had imposed, invoked not simply
"ordre" but "ordre public"-rendered in the English opinion as
both "public order" and "public policy." The Court has deployed
this broader notion of "ordre public" to rationalize other restrictions that states have placed upon religious practice.8 2 Generally,
activities may disrupt the "ordre public" if they disturb religious
peace and tolerance, affect public hygiene, or fail to demonstrate
respect for the convictions of others.8 3 Maintaining the "ordre
public" thus consists in ensuring that religions remain within
what the state deems appropriate parameters without offending
others;8 4 under this conception, pluralism requires that the state
81 See Tahzib-Lie, supra note 6, at 83 n. 93 (asserting that, in the international human
rights context, "'Public order' should be narrowly construed to mean the prevention of
public disorder. It should not be confused with a similar sounding French legal expression
used in civil and administrative law and private international law, lordre public, which
relates to the fundamental public policies of a society"); see also Alain Garay et al., The
Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief in France, 19
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 785, 803-6 (2005) (comparing the French and Convention limitations
upon religious freedom based upon "public order").
82 See generally Rolland, supra note 80.
83 Id. at 250-70 (defining "ordre public" as the rule that is imposed upon all will and
stating that protecting the "ordre public" may include, among other things, maintaining
security in the form of religious peace and tolerance, public hygiene, and respect for the
convictions of others).
84 See Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, Application 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2004/June/ChamberjudgmentsSahinandTekin.htm
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determine the proper boundaries of religion and assiduously police these limits.
It is hardly surprising under this scheme for managing religions that states would choose to focus upon religious institutions
rather than individuals; the institution can thereby become the
locus for controlling the free exercise of its individual adherents.8 5 By emphasizing the necessity of maintaining a pluralistic
society and the harmonious co-existence of religions within the
democratic state, international law thus considers the institutional dimensions of religious practice more than the individual
ones. A different and, I would argue, superior, framework for assessing free exercise claims is, however, provided by the texts of
the Convention and the Covenant themselves. Both documents
focus their attention upon the individual's right to religious liberty, yet acknowledge the relevance of the group to which she belongs to the establishment of her claim. Article 9 of the Convention contemplates that the individual will be able to "manifest his
religion or belief' "either alone or in community with others,"
while Article 27 of the Covenant speaks not simply of the rights
of religious minorities but instead those of "persons belonging to
such minorities." Rather than oscillating between restrictive accounts of individuals' religious liberty and consideration of religious institutions broadly conceived, international tribunals
should take seriously the relationship between individual and
group in the exercise of religious freedom. Had the Court in
Cha'are Shalom done so, it might have considered the significance to the individual adherent of being a member of a religious
group that articulated and implemented its own procedures of
ritual slaughter. Expressing the right at issue in the context of
collective practice might have rendered it more significant and
allowed a thicker description of the alleged inequality between
(last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (upholding the Turkish ban prohibiting university students from
wearing Islamic headscarfs, citing the "impact which wearing such a symbol, which is
presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty, may have on those who choose not
to wear it"); see also Sylvie Langlaude, Indoctrination,Secularism, Religious Liberty, and
the ECHR, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 929, 929-38 (2006) (discussing the Court's view of the
state's role in preventing religious indoctrination and protecting individuals against others' religious views).
85 Thus, in conjunction with advocating for church autonomy, Rik Torfs suggests that
religions engage more assiduously in such activities by entering into agreements to refrain from proselytizing and establishing "a mechanism concerning enforcement, agreed
upon by the religions involved." Torfs, supra note 5, at 146-48.
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Cha'are Shalom and ACIP members. It might even have led the
Court to affirm the rights of Cha'are Shalom members to manifest their religion through ritual slaughter.

While the individualist approach to rights prevalent in the
United States may not reflect all the dimensions of religious liberty, the group and institutionally focused paradigms found
elsewhere possess their own problems. In particular, as the
Cha'are Shalom and Waldman cases demonstrate, state recognition of certain religions or attempts to provide benefits for religious minorities may lead to unequal treatment of dissenting
sub-groups and recent entrants into the religious arena. An approach more salutary for religious liberty might be to remain focused on the individual claimant, not as a cardboard cutout,
stripped of context, but as a three-dimensional protagonist whose
beliefs and identity are inexplicable outside of the rich dramatic
form provided by the religious group within which her character
has developed.

